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64 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
PATENTS-SOME ELEMENTS OF A COMBINATION BEING OLD
DOES NOT NECESSARILY NEGATIVE INVENTION.
The U. S. District Court for Connectcut in the case of The Carnes
Limb Co. v. Delworth Arm Co. (June 16, 1921) held that a patet
for a device which is inoperative or fails to accomplish the desired end, is not
an anticipation of one which successfully accomplishes it. The court also held
that the fact that some of the elements of a combination are old doe3 not
negative invention, where the combination is new and produces a new and prac-
tical device. In rerldering the decision in this case the court went on to say
that in order to establish anticipation it is not sufficient to pick out one part
of a patented device from one prior patent, another part from some other, and
so on, and then say that it is not invention to bring these several parts together,
especially when the patentee is the first to conceive of so doing, and by so doing
has produced a practical operating device.
A rather interesting coincidence in this case is the fact that Carnes, prior
tb his invention had lost a foot, and Delworth an arm, and that both had
perfected their respective inventions as a consequence of their inability to find
a suitable article on the market to replace their lost limbs.
PLEADING - DEMURRER ORE TENUS-NOT VIEWED IN SAME
LIGHT AS A FORMAL DEMURRER.
In the Case of Adams v. Pickerel Walnut Co., 232 S. W. 271, (Mo.) an agree-
ment is set forth between plaintiff (Aidams) and Craig for the purchase of
certain walnut logs by Craig. Craig. in turn, was to ship the logs to defendant
(Pickerel Walnut Co.). For certain of these logs which were of a superior
quality, plaintiff refused to accept the price agreed upon and as a result of this
Craig refused to accept certain of the logs which were of an inferior quality.
Following this there was continued correspondence between plaintiff and de-
fendant concerning the sale of the logs. Omitting certain details, a letter com-
prising part of the above-mentioned correspondence and marked "Exhibit G" was
offered in evidence by plaintiff. In this letter defendants agreed to take the
logs provided all of them were loaded under the "supervision" of Craig. As
a matter of fact the loading of the logs was juptrvised by Mr. Moore, attorney
for plaintiff. After the logs were loaded a number of them were lpst, owing
to a sudden rise of the Mississippi river. In the case at bar the plaintiff
brought action against the defendant lumber company for the value of the logs
lost and for the additional money he (plaintiff) had expended in trying to save
them. In the court below plaintiff obtained judgement against defendant for
$181926. In the St. Louis Court of Appeals the judgment was reversed,
ahho upon other grounds than the particular point to be commented upon here.
At the commencement of the trial defendant objected to the introduction
of any evidence on the ground that the second amended petition upon which
the case was tried did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
Appelant claimed that tho the petition alleged that defendnt agreed to buy
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certain walnut logs from plaintiff, provided plaintiff had the logs loaded under
the "supervision" of Craig, the petition does not aver that plaintiffs did in fact
have such logs loaded under the "supervision" of Craig. From this it
will be seen that the defendant did not attack the petition by a formal
demurrer and did not raise any objection until after the jury was
impanelled. Plaintiff by objecting to the introduction of any evidence at the
commencement of the trial in effect entered a demurrer ore tenus and the
question ari.es as to the view taken by courts of such a demurrer.
In 11 Pomeroy on Code Pleading, pages 446 and 7, it is stated that "Where
a complaint fails to state a cause of action, and the defendant at the trial
objects, on that ground, to the introducti.a of any evidence, such objection is
equivalent to a general demurrer, and a judgement for the plaintiff must
be jeversed." This view seems to be supported by Hays v. Lewis, 17 Wis. 210.
Following this statement in Pomeroy, supra, it says, "Demurrer under this
subdivision may be taken at any staga of the game" and cites cases substantiat-
ing the san:e. Gould v. Glass, 19 Barb. 186; Montgomery Co. Bank v. Albany
City, 3 Seld. 464; People v. Booth, 32 N. Y. 397. The practice is recog-
iz cd ir. nearly half the states "in civil cases.' 15 H. L R. 73& The proceed-
ing, however, is so hedged about with technicalities that it is infrequently re-
sorted to add when invoked has been the subject of continuing disapproval of
the courts ever since it was said by Chief Justice Tilghman that "he who demurs
to parol evidence engages in uphill business." Bouvier's Law Dictionary.
In Missouri, however, a demurrer ore tenus is not viewed in the same light
as a formal demurrer. Young v. Schicide Iron Co. 103 Mo. 324. Reverting to
the statement, supra, in Pomeroy that an objection to the introduction of evi-
dence, is equivalent to a general demurrer the view is taken in Missouri that, "If
a petition defectively states a cause of action it is good on general demurrer"
State ex rel v. Carroll, 63 Mo. 156; Ferguson v. Davidson, 65 Mo. App. 193.
It iL only where it is so wholly wanting in necessary averments that it fails
to state any cause of action whatever 'that a demurrer will lie. Verdin v. St.
Louis, 131 Mo. 26. Objections to the introduction of any evidence come after
the parties have prepared tor trial and when the case is called for hearing, and
arc too late to deserve a very favorable consideration at the hands of the
court. Even tho a petition is informal and the cause of action is defectively
stated, still if it states sufficient -facts to show a cause of action, the objection
made at the trial to the introduction of any evidence should be overruled.
Donaldson v. Co. of Butler, 98 Mo. 163. Also, if a matter material -to the
plaintili's cause of action is not expressly averred in the petition, but is neces-
sarily implied in what is stated theanin,-tho objection thereto nmust be taken by
tlemurrer or motion; such objection cannot be made at the trial by the objec-
tion to the introduction of evidecoe, and is cured by verdict. Thompson v.
Stearns, W3 "Mo. App. 3d4, loc. cit. 35. The view taken in Missouri of a
demurrer ore tenus, as shown by 2asS cited, supra, seems to be in keeping
with the characterization of the same by Justice Emery in Dicky v. Schneider,
3 S. & R. (Pa.) 416, where he says that its use is "an unusual and antiquated
practice."
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